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Abstract
Objective: In March 2007, we investigated a cluster of Nipah encephalitis to identify risk factors for Nipah infection in
Bangladesh.
Methods: We defined confirmed Nipah cases by the presence of IgM and IgG antibodies against Nipah virus in serum. Case-
patients, who resided in the same village during the outbreak period but died before serum could be collected, were
classified as probable cases.
Results: We identified three confirmed and five probable Nipah cases. There was a single index case. Five of the secondary
cases came in close physical contact to the index case when she was ill. Case-patients were more likely to have physical
contact with the index case (71% cases versus 0% controls, p=,0.001). The index case, on her third day of illness, and all
the subsequent cases attended the same religious gathering. For three probable cases including the index case, we could
not identify any known risk factors for Nipah infection such as physical contact with Nipah case-patients, consumption of
raw date palm juice, or contact with sick animals or fruit bats.
Conclusion: Though person-to-person transmission remains an important mode of transmission for Nipah infection, we
could not confirm the source of infection for three of the probable Nipah case-patients. Continued surveillance and
outbreak investigations will help better understand the transmission of Nipah virus and develop preventive strategies.
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Introduction
Among the 122 Nipah cases identified between 2001 to 2007 in
Bangladesh, 87 (71%) died and 62 (51%) developed illness
following person to person transmission [1]. One of the distinct
features of Nipah virus epidemiology in Bangladesh is that only
certain case-patients apparently spread the disease to others. In a
previous review of cases in Bangladesh, we identified only nine
Nipah spreaders and each of them spread the disease to a mean of
seven persons (range 1–22). All of the Nipah spreaders died [1].
Though human-to-human transmission plays an important role in
subsequent transmission of Nipah [2,3], in Bangladesh some of the
identified routes of introduction of Nipah virus from its natural
reservoir, Pteropus fruit bats, in to humans are though drinking of
raw date palm sap contaminated by bats, contact with infected
animals and possibly through direct contact with bat secretion[4].
Nipah virus has been isolated from human saliva, urine, nasal
and pharyngeal secretions [5,6,7,8]. Nipah case-patients with
difficulty breathing were more likely to spread the virus (12%
versus 0% P=0.03) [1]. Findings from outbreak investigations in
Bangladesh demonstrate that family members, friends, relatives
and neighbors who came in direct contact with infected
respiratory and other body secretions of Nipah spreaders were
significantly at greater risk of subsequently acquiring the infection
[2,3].
In April 2007, a joint investigation team formed from the
Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR)
and the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research,
Bangladesh (ICDDR, B) investigated a cluster of fatal encephalitis
in a village of Sadar Upazila (sub-district) of Kushtia District. The
objectives of the investigation were to identify the cause of the
outbreak and the risk factors for development of illness.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | e13570Methods
Case Definition and Identification
We defined suspect case patients as persons having fever with
headache and/or cough or persons having fever with new onset of
altered mental status or seizures residing in the outbreak area with
an onset of illness during March and April, 2007. We identified
suspect case-patients by collecting information from the local
health workers in the community and by asking community
residents if they were aware of anyone meeting the suspect case-
definition in the affected community. We also investigated all
deaths in that community in that time period. We asked family
members of the decedent, if the decedent had symptoms
compatible with the suspect case definition prior to death. We
used structured questionnaires to record history of illness and
general information about exposures for each suspect case-patient.
The team requested the local health authority in the outbreak area
to report to the IEDCR if any case-patient with fever and altered
mental status came to the local health facility for treatment.
The team collected blood samples from living suspect case-
patients. The samples were centrifuged in the field then
transported on wet ice to the laboratory at IEDCR where they
were stored at 270uC. We tested the samples at IEDCR with an
immunoglobulin M (IgM) capture enzyme immunoassay that
detects Nipah IgM antibodies[9]. The samples were then
confirmed at Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta using
IgG and IgM capture enzyme immunoassay. We categorized
suspect case-patients who had laboratory evidence of acute
infection, shown by presence of IgM and IgG to Nipah virus in
serum, as confirmed cases. Suspect case-patients who died and
who resided in the same village as confirmed case-patients during
the outbreak period were classified as probable Nipah case-
patients because no specimen was available as the patient died
before the investigation was initiated.
Qualitative Study
A team of two Bangladeshi anthropologists conducted in-depth
interviews with living confirmed and probable case-patients and
with family members who cared for cases, including the deceased
case-patients. They also conducted informal discussions with
neighbors of case-patients with the objective of exploring possible
modes of transmission of disease.
Case-control Study
The field team enrolled confirmed and probable case-patients in
a case-control study to investigate exposures associated with Nipah
infection, including person-to-person transmission. We selected
three neighborhood controls for each case-patient, starting from
the fourth closest courtyard to the case-patient to reduce over
matching of demographic characteristics of neighboring house-
hold, confirming that no members in the households of that
courtyard were ill during the outbreak period. Each courtyard had
two to three households and we selected only one household from
each courtyard which was closest to case-patient’s household. The
household resident closest in age to the case-patient was eligible to
participate as a control. We selected controls closets in age to the
cases not to control for confounding effect of age but to provide
interviewers with easy guidelines to select controls. The field team
selected only one control from each courtyard. This process was
repeated at the next closest household until we enrolled three
controls for each case.
We used proxy respondents for each case-patient who was too
sick to answer, or who had died. Proxy respondents included
family members and friends who were aware of the case-patients
activities and probable risk exposures in the 30 days preceding
their illness. Multiple proxy respondents were used to ensure
maximum reliability of the information as friends or colleagues
might be more informed about possible exposures outside the
home whereas family members were likely to be better informed
about domestic exposures. The field investigation team used a
standardized structured questionnaire to collect information on
demographics, signs and symptoms of illness and possible risk
factors for Nipah transmission such as: exposure to ill patients,
including touching, staying in the same room, feeding, sharing a
bed or cleaning body secretions; exposure to sick animals in the
surrounding area; history of climbing trees; sighting bats near area
of residence or working place, contact with bats, eating fruits
picked from the ground; and drinking raw date palm sap.
Statistics
We used descriptive statistics to analyze the socio-demographic
and clinical profiles of case-patients. For the case-control study, we
used an unmatched analysis because neighbors were chosen as
controls to ensure that controls and case-patients were represen-
tative of the same population, not to control for confounding
factors. We enrolled persons closest in age as controls, not to
control confounding by age, but rather to provide simple
standardized guidelines to the interviewers for control selection.
We used odds ratios (OR) to estimate the association of each
exposure with disease and calculated 95% confidence limits (CI)
around the odds ratio. To assess that observations were not only
due to chance, we used the chi square test when expected cells
were $5 and the Fisher exact test when expected cell sizes were
,5. We considered any association to be statistically significant if
the p value was ,0.05. To test the hypothesis that Nipah virus was
transmitted from the index case to other case- patients, we
excluded the index case in all the analyses of person-to-person
transmission.
Ethics
All human study participants gave informed verbal consent for
participation in this investigation. The Ethical Review Committee
at ICDDR, B reviewed and approved a protocol for encephalitis
surveillance and outbreak investigation. As the study was part of
an emergency outbreak investigation, approval from an Institu-
tional Review Board was not required.
Results
Descriptive findings
The team collected 13 serum samples from 19 suspect case-
patients. Seven of the serum samples were collected within less
than seven days of illness onset. Three of the four serum samples
that were collected after 10 days of illness onset had detectable
IgM and IgG Nipah virus antibodies and were identified as
confirmed cases. Five (26%) of the 19 suspected case-patients, who
resided in the same outbreak village and died during the outbreak
period but before samples could be collected, were categorized as
probable cases. We also identified one additional death in the
outbreak area but the decedent had chronic abdominal problem
and had severe abdominal pain before death. He was not included
into the study as the deceased did not have symptoms compatible
with the case-definition.
All the cases were clustered in time. The index case developed
illness on March 17, 2007, followed by a single secondary wave of
illness 12–16 days later (Figure 1). The mean age of the case-
patients was 38 years (range 27–55 years) and 25% were males.
The mean duration between illness onset and death was 4 days
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two confirmed and four probable case-patients had fever with
altered mental status and or respiratory difficulty.
Exposure and illness history
Proxies reported that the index case, Patient A (a 55 year old
woman, probable case), developed illness on March 17, 2007 and
died on the sixth day of illness on March 22, 2007. On the first two
days of illness Patient A developed fever, headache, cough, muscle
pain and joint pain which progressed to restlessness, difficulty in
breathing, vomiting, altered mental status, spitting of blood tinged
saliva and loss of consciousness over the last four days of illness.
Patient A reportedly did not have any exposure to identified risk
factors for Nipah infection, including drinking raw date palm sap
or partially bat eaten fruits, contact with other Nipah patients,
climbing trees or contact with bats or sick animals. Five of Patient
A’s caregivers (Patient B, C, D, E and F) subsequently developed
Nipah compatible illness.
Patient B (confirmed case), a friend, took care of Patient A
during the entire illness episode; she slept with her at night, carried
her to the doctor, cooked food for her, doused her head with water
several times, cleaned her vomit, bathed her and shared rice with
her from the same plate. Patient B developed Nipah illness 8 days
after Patient A died (duration of exposure to illness onset 8–13
days). Patient C (probable case), another friend, also took care of
Patient A and slept with her during the last three days of her
illness; she developed illness within 11 days of contact with Patient
A (duration of exposure to illness onset 9–11 days). Patient C died
after seven days of illness. Patient D (confirmed case), a neighbor
of Patient A, massaged the index case’s head with oil and cleaned
her oral secretions during her last two days of illness when she
developed breathing difficulty, altered mental status and began
spitting. Patient D became ill within 12 days of contact with
Patient A. Another neighbor of Patient A, Patient E (confirmed
case), reported that she only touched the hand of the index case
once, to check for fever, and contracted the illness 12 days after
illness onset and seven days after death of the index case. We do
not know on which day of illness or how many times she visited
Patient A during her illness episode. Patient F (probable case),
Patient A’s brother-in-law, only came in physical contact with
Patient A on the third day of her illness. He became sick 11 days
after contact with the index case and died after six days of illness.
None of these five subsequent cases (Patients B-F) had exposure to
any other Nipah patient or patient with fever and altered mental
status other than Patient A. They also did not have any history of
drinking raw date palm sap or coming in contact with any bat or
other sick animal.
The grave of a Muslim religious leader, who died in 2001, is in
the outbreak village and his followers from different villages gather
annually for an anniversary ceremony. On the third day of the
index case’s illness, on March 19, 2007, this religious ceremony
was in the courtyard adjacent to the grave of the religious leader.
Although the index case was quite ill at this time, with a severe
cough and a varying level of consciousness, she still attended the
ceremony. All the other seven case-patients (case-patients B to H)
also took part in the ceremony. During the ceremony, the index
Figure 1. Distribution of Nipah cases by date of onset of illness, March-April 2007.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013570.g001
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and D along with other unidentified women, carried her back to
her home. We could not confirm if any other men apart from
Patient D helped in carrying her home.
Proxy respondents of the two probable case-patients, Patients G
and H, who were present at the religious gathering, did not recall
observing any physical contact between Patient G or H and the
index case in the religious gathering. Proxy respondents also did
not report any contact with other Nipah cases, contact with
anyone with fever and altered mental status or seizures or contact
with sick or dead animals prior to their illness onset. They also did
not have any history of possible exposure to environmental risk
factors for Nipah infection. Patient G and H both developed illness
11 and 14 days after attending the religious ceremony. Patient G
first developed fever and headache with generalized weakness. On
the third day of illness she developed severe respiratory distress
and died on the same day. Patient H reportedly only developed
fever, headache, restlessness and severe weakness. After one day of
illness he was taken to a hospital where he died before admission.
However, the manager of the place where Patient H worked
reported that four days before his death he had borrowed some
money saying that he was not feeling well and needed to seek
medical care, but the manager did not know the details of his
illness.
Case-control study
We enrolled the three confirmed and five probable cases and
three unmatched controls for each case-patient in a case-control
study. We used proxy respondents for six case-patients (6/8). Case-
patients and controls were similar in age (mean age 38 years
SD69 in cases versus 39 years with SD610 in controls, p=0.9)
and sex (25% male cases versus 21% male control, OR=1, 95%
CI 0.19–8.30, p=1).
The only risk factor associated with acquiring Nipah infection
was having physical contact (including touching, sharing the same
bed and cleaning body secretions) with the index case during
illness (71% cases versus 0% controls, odds ratio undefined,
p=,0.001) in the bivariate analysis. Though we identified two
bat roosts within three and six kilometers from the outbreak area,
there were no significant associations between illness and drinking
raw date palm sap, climbing trees, sighting bat in the area of
residence or working place, eating fruits picked from the ground or
having contact with bats or sick animals (Table 2).
Discussion
The findings of this outbreak investigation, specifically the
epidemic curve with a single secondary peak of illness supported
by a strong association between contact with index case and illness
provide compelling evidence for person-to-person transmission of
Nipah infection from the index case to the subsequent cases. In
this outbreak, five of the subsequent case patients were directly
involved in caring for the index case when she was sick. The five
subsequent cases developed illness within 8–13 days of contact
Table 1. Characteristics of Nipah case-patients, Sadar Upazila,
Kushtia District, Bangladesh, March-April 2007.
Characteristics N=8 (%)
Age
Mean (SD) in yrs 38 (9)








Respiratory distress 5 (63)
Muscle pain 5 (63)
Altered mental status 4 (50)
Restlessness 4 (50)
Unconscious * 3 (38)
Joint pain 3 (38)
Case fatality 5 (63)
Onset of illness to death (n=5), Mean (range) 4 (1–7)
*a subset of patient who developed altered mental status also developed
unconsciousness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013570.t001
Table 2. Bivariate analysis of risk factors for Nipah infection, Sadar Upazila, Kushtia District, Bangladesh, March-April 2007.
Risk Factor Cases Controls OR (CI) P value
Number % Number %
Male sex 2 25% 5 21% 1 (0.19–8.3) 1
Climbed trees 0 0% 1 4% undefined 1
Physical contact with living animals
Cow 5 62.5% 11 46% 1.9(0.4–10) 0.7
Dog 2 25% 3 13% 2.3 (0.3–17) 0.6
Drank raw date palm sap 0 0% 0 0% undefined 0.25
Climbed any tree 0 0% 1 4.1% undefined 1.00
Had contact with bats 0 0% 0 0% Undefined 0.25
Had seen bats in around place of
residence at night
1 12.5% 2 8.3% 1.6(0.12–20) 1.00
Physical contact with the Index case 5 71% 0 0% undefined 0.000
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013570.t002
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of human Nipah virus infection observed in other settings [10].
Similar transmission of Nipah virus has been documented
repeatedly and probably results from contact with infected
respiratory and possibly other body secretions of Nipah patients
while caring for them [2,3,11].
A unique finding and a major limitation of this investigation is
that the index cases and patient G and H did not have definite
history of identified risk factors. These three case-patients did not
have any history of consuming raw date palm sap within one
month prior to death which has been implicated as a possible route
of transmission of Nipah virus directly from its natural reservoir in
Bangladesh [12]. There was also no history of contact with bat
secretion or contact with sick animal [13]. Though we could not
ascertain close physical contact of patient G and H with index
case, it is possible that they had direct contact with contaminated
respiratory droplet or a fomite from the index case. The onset of
illness spanned over 17 days for these three cases suggesting that
their exposure was not simultaneous, and that if this were direct
transmission from bats there were multiple transmission events.
Patient G had symptoms similar to Nipah illness[8]. Patient H
reportedly only had fever and headache and was included into the
study due to our broad cases definition. However, only fever and
headache are usually considered harmless by Bangladeshi
community residents who seek hospital care only when their
health condition becomes serious[11]. Though we will never know
the exact cause of death of Patient G and H, sudden death of a
previously healthy individual is a rare event and clustering of the
deaths in time and place during a Nipah outbreak suggests that
Nipah infection was a likely cause of the deaths.
Continued surveillance and outbreak investigations will help in
better understanding of transmission of Nipah virus from bats to
humans and then from humans to humans. Behavior change
communication promoting feasible steps, to avoid unprotected
contact with respiratory and oral secretions, such as adequate
hand washing or the use of respiratory barriers, while caring for
patients with respiratory symptoms both at family and hospital
levels could minimize spread of the disease by limiting person-to-
person transmission.
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